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Jean-Claude Milner’s Le sage trompeur (2013), a controversial recent piece of
French Spinoza literature, remains regrettably understudied in the English-
speaking world. Adopting Leo Strauss’ esoteric reading method, Milner
alleges that Spinoza dissimulates his genuine analysis of the causes of the
persecution and survival of the Jewish people within a brief “manifesto”
found at the end of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), Chapter 3.
According to Milner, Spinoza holds that the Jewish people themselves are
responsible for the hatred of the Jewish people, and that the engine of their
longevity is the hatred they engender. Additionally, claims Milner, Spinoza
covertly insinuates that the solution to this persistent state of hatred consists
in the mass apostasy of the Jewish people under the leadership of a Sabbatai
Zevi-like figure. This article presents the Milner--Spinoza controversy to the
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scholarship on Spinoza’s relation to Judaism. While refuting Milner’s read-
ing of Spinoza, I simultaneously clarify relevant elements of Spinoza’s dis-
cussions of Judaism in the TTP, such as Spinoza’s examination of Jewish
identity and the nature of divine election, Spinoza’s understanding of the
causes of national hatred, and Spinoza’s appeals to Portuguese, Spanish,
Chinese, and Turkish political history.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of modern philosophy is an academic affair. Rarely do
works in the field touch on questions of interest to a broader public.
Jean-Claude Milner’s Le sage trompeur: Libres raisonnements sur Spinoza et
les juifs is one such work.1 I will argue against Milner’s reading of
Spinoza on Judaism, which I take to be fundamentally wrong.
However, the work remains important and interesting in as much as
it sheds light on both the curiously exalted state of contemporary
French Spinoza scholarship as well as the tense political situation of
Judaism in France. It is regrettable that the work, a genuine, if conten-
tious, piece of Spinoza scholarship, and its author, an enfant terrible of
contemporary French philosophy,2 remain unknown in the English-
speaking world.
Spinoza’s relationship with Judaism has long been a source of con-
troversy. At twenty-three, Spinoza’s life was irrevocably changed when
the parnassim, or lay governors, of Amsterdam’s Portuguese Jewish
community determined to pronounce against him the herem,or writ
of “expulsion,” in July 1656.3 It was the harshest herem ever pronounced
against a member of the community. Determining what incited the
violence of the herem—what the text refers to as Spinoza’s “evil opinions
and acts [mas opinioins e obras]”, his “abominable heresies [horrendas
heregias]”, and his “monstrous deeds [ynormes obras]”—and whether
there are, nonetheless, unbroken philosophical debts in Spinoza’s ma-
ture works to his Jewish roots, remains a prominent set of problems in
the literature.4
Milner’s prognosis is no less dramatic than are the denunciations
found in the herem. According to Milner, Spinoza is a bona fide “anti-
Jewish” thinker.5 Spinoza’s “anti-Judaism” is not brazen. Rather, as the
title of Milner’s work suggests (“le sage trompeur”), it involves decep-
tion and trickery. Spinoza knew to dissimulate his “anti-Jewish” think-
ing, avers Milner, by means of an extremely carefully worded
“manifeso” put forth in the concluding paragraphs of the Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus (TTP) [1670], Chapter 3.6 The bulk of Milner’s com-
mentary thus consists in a Straussian-inspired exegesis in which Milner
spells out the content of Spinoza’s “anti-Jewish” agenda. Milner’s inter-
pretation develops Spinoza’s examination of the nature of Jewish po-
litical identity and divine election, Spinoza’s analysis of the causes of
the persistent persecution of the Jewish people, and Spinoza’s appeals
to Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, and Turkish political history.
The work represents a significant escalation of the stakes in the
discussion of Spinozism. Milner purports to unveil in the TTP an early
modern prefiguration of contemporary antisemitism. On Milner’s view,
this consists in the belief that the “Jewish name” (le nom juif) is the
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greatest source of animosity among nations due to its obstructing sup-
posedly universalist political visions. This new antisemitism, alleges
Milner, is assimilationist in theory and practice and is motivated by
the desire to demolish vestiges of premodern religious authority and
national tradition. Milner alleges that this conceptual bundle is present
in, if not generated by, Spinoza’s “manifesto.” A consequence of
Milner’s reading is to shore up the characterization of Spinoza as the
chief theorist of the “radical Enlightenment.”7 Not incidentally,
Spinoza (for Milner) is also representative of the Enlightenment’s res-
olute attempt at getting to the root of the so-called Jewish Question.8
Responding to such a reading is important principally for two rea-
sons. First, because Milner’s interpretation involves a number of con-
voluted moves that need to be pointed out and criticized for their utter
implausibility. Second, because Spinoza makes several claims that do
suggest latent hostility to Judaism but which have received insufficient
attention in the literature. Clarifying both the actual content of
Spinoza’s TTP and Milner’s interpretation thus secures Spinoza against
Milner’s accusation while it also sheds light on the veritable tensions in
Spinoza’s discussion of Judaism. The current political malaise in
France—high rates of antisemitic violence and hostility between com-
munities of faith—acts as a further reminder of the rather grave stakes
of the discussion. Regrettably, the majority of Spinoza’s French readers,
long-attuned to hearing of Spinoza in exclusively laudatory tones, were
scandalized by Milner’s reading, and thus simply dismissed it.9
In this article, I propose to critically reconstruct the main lines of
Milner’s interpretation, while simultaneously clarifying pertinent
aspects of Spinoza’s views on Judaism as put forth in the TTP. I begin
by elucidating matters relating to Spinoza and Judaism in recent French
literature with the intention of explaining how Milner’s work relates to
its immediate context. I then turn to clarifying Spinoza’s views on
Jewish identity and Jewish political history as put forth in TTP,
Chapter 3, the chapter from which Milner draws most extensively in
advancing his interpretation. After this, I move to discussing Milner’s
interpretation itself, which I examine in four parts. First, I examine his
interpretation of Spinoza’s motto, “caute.” Second, I examine his read-
ing of Spinoza’s analysis of the causes of national hatred. Third, I ex-
amine his interpretation of Spinoza’s appeals to Portuguese, Spanish,
and Chinese historical examples. Last, I inspect Milner’s interpretation
of the covert role played by Sabbatai Zevi’s (1626--76) apostasy in
Spinoza’s prognosis of Jewish persecution. In conclusion, I return
what I believe to be the central, broader lessons that can be drawn
from Milner’s text.
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“FROM MAO TO MOSES”
Spinoza’s afterlife as a Jewish thinker is neither less nor more rich than
his afterlife in French philosophy. To both interpretative traditions
belong philosophers in their own right, such as Salomon Maimon
and Leo Strauss, on the one hand, or Louis Althusser and Gilles
Deleuze, on the other. However, is there such a thing as a Franco-
Jewish tradition of reading Spinoza? As a means of approaching
Milner’s work, I will argue that Milner’s interpretation of Spinoza
should be seen first and foremost within the context of this Franco-
Jewish interpretative tradition, and what makes that tradition unique—
and uniquely controversial—is the claim that Spinoza is in some sense
“anti-Jewish.” Briefly evincing the guiding themes of the Franco-Jewish
Spinoza tradition as manifest in the work of its leading figures will shed
light on why Milner’s work resonated so strongly in his native country
while also clarifying some of the unwritten assumptions of Milner’s
reading. Before elaborating further, however, notice that though there
is a veritable cornucopia of Francophone literature on Spinoza’s rela-
tion to Cartesianism, Marxism, etc., including influential studies of
Spinoza’s views on Christianity,10 French-language studies of
Spinoza’s relation to Judaism are relatively uncommon.11 This stands
in contrast with the state of English-language literature on Spinoza,
where Spinoza’s Judaism is a rather well-tilled terrain of academic de-
bate.12 Though marginalized, French-language discussions of Spinoza’s
Judaism have still given rise to a very unconventional and original un-
derstanding of Spinoza.
The interpretative tradition I have in mind is inaugurated by
Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas’ influence on Milner’s discussion of
Spinoza is unmistakable. Significantly, Levinas is the first and best-
known of Spinoza’s French readers to explicitly state that Spinoza is,
in effect, an enemy of the Jewish people.13 For Levinas, Spinoza
“betrays” Judaism by implicitly suggesting that Christianity supersedes
Judaism. On Levinas’ understanding, Spinoza holds Judaism to be in-
ferior to Christianity; it is encumbered by its particularistic rituals,
which contribute nothing to its value, whereas Christianity, only con-
cerned with moral action, is allegedly universalist in scope.14 Yet
Judaism, claims Levinas, is not only irreducible to the core moral con-
tent that Christianity ostensibly universalizes in the cult of charity and
justice, but moreover, it is something like irreducibility itself, standing
for the dogged refusal to let a singular people and history be subsumed
under universalist political agendas. In Levinas, the political subtext is
barely hidden from sight; in Milner, as we shall see, it becomes blind-
ingly bright: Judaism stands for the resistance to total political
authority.15
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As much as Levinas may be the founder of the tradition in ques-
tion, and its most famous representative, it is another less well-known
thinker who gives the tradition its fullest expression, and to whose work
we now briefly turn.
Hannah Arendt once wrote how the name of Martin Heidegger
spread across prewar Germany “like the rumor of a hidden king.”16
Something to this effect could be said of the name of Benny Levy (b.
1945--d. 2003) in postwar France. Levy was the “hidden king” of post-
war French Jewish philosophy. His life traces one of its most character-
istic trajectories, “from Mao to Moses.”17 Born in Cairo, Levy, an
extremely active agent in the May 1968 protests, in 1970 founded (as
“Pierre Victor”) la Gauche proletarienne, an ultra-left-wing Maoist cell,
only to soon thereafter become Jean-Paul Sartre’s secretary (with whom
he helped found the newspaper Liberation). By the late 1970s, Levy had
renounced Marxism and what he would thereafter call the “political
vision of the world.” Thus began Levy’s famous return to Judaism.
The migration “from Mao to Moses” culminated in 2000 with the co-
founding (with Bernard-Henry Levy and Alain Finkielkraut) of the
Institut d’etudes levinassiennes in Jerusalem.
Levy’s writing on Spinoza casts a large shadow over Milner’s text. In
his Le Meurtre du Pasteur, Levy analyzes the political writings of Plato,
Hobbes, Spinoza, and Freud, and defends the mystique of traditional
authority against efforts to naturalize it.18 It is also a confessional work,
and in it Levy frequently evokes his misplaced enthusiasm for Maoism.
Thus, “it could only be written in Jerusalem,” that is to say after his
conversion from “Mao to Moses,” once he could look back on his
youthful folly.19 As he puts it while playing on the popular May ’68
graffiti slogan (“under the pavement, the beach”), the volume is the
expression of a lifelong preoccupation: “A suspicion was born in the
early 70s: and if under the pavement of politics was the beach of the-
ology?. . . . The aim of thought: get rid of the crypto. The political is
crypto-theological.”20
In the third part of the work (“Spinoza: la Duplicite”), Levy turns to
Spinoza’s “extremely modern” TTP with an eye to explaining its func-
tion vis-a-vis the Ethics.21 According to Levy, Spinoza’s view that messi-
anism consists in the possibility of being at peace and studying is
unmistakably Jewish.22 Spinoza’s Ethics is thus written for the “happy
few” that enjoy a life of study. However, faithful to the Greeks, Spinoza
also believes that the multitude will never be philosophers.23 The po-
litical works address and improve on this discussion: what matters is not
that there be a philosopher King, but that philosophers be free to prac-
tice philosophy. Levy’s reading focuses primarily on the issue of the
status of prophetic revelation in the TTP and Spinoza’s injunction to
interpret Scripture by its own light.24 For Levy, Spinoza systematically,
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deliberately, misrepresents the intentions of Scripture and obscures the
“subjectivation” achieved by the prophetic “voice.”
On Levy’s understanding, Spinoza’s critique is solely meant to mo-
tivate the naturalization of political power and make way for the level-
ing of humankind under the leadership of state-like entities. Yet
Spinoza’s alleged “model” for humanity is lawless, communal, and, by
the same token, rational.25 Thus, in theory, laws exist only as stop-gaps
and interim measures for the benefit of philosophers. Still, in practice,
these stop-gaps and interim measures are omnipresent—the multitude
will never become philosophically inclined. All genuine transcendence,
that is to say resistance to man-made authority, is gone. The naturali-
zation of politics, the belief that all political authority is merely derived
from humankind’s conventions and deeds, puts absolute power into
the hands of humankind. Similarly, the “primal scene” on Mount
Sinai is denigrated, and becomes merely historical. For Levy, however,
there is only the absolute in politics [. . .] through the denial of the
primordial prophetic experience. Once we no longer hear prophecy,
we hear the voices of the political vision of the world. Only after we
step away from the political vision of the world, from the figure of the
absolute in politics, will we hear again these [prophetic] voices, since
these voices are inscribed for all generations. There is nothing
“historical” about Sinai. It institutes Israel forever. Every Israel has
this experience of the voices -- awoken by study or dead in the ruins.26
Spinoza’s own equivocal treatment of Moses as prophetic lawgiver
is wide of the mark: the event on Sinai is witnessed by all Israel.27 Yet
Levy further maintains that only the pastor, upheld by tradition, can act
as a barrier against absolute power in politics, which itself tends to
destroy the dignified distinction of generations, ages, individuals,
singularities.
Milner shares Levy’s worries about Spinoza’s naturalization of po-
litical authority, and considers, like Levy, that the Spinozistic project to
naturalize politics grounds authoritarian tendencies (“the absolute”) in
politics, and that the Jewish tradition would act as a barrier to these
tendencies—Moses versus Mao. He also shares with Levy a very con-
densed, elliptical style of writing replete with rumination and gravitas.
Readers curious to understand the context of Milner’s discussion would
do well to revisit Levy in detail. Milner’s volume properly belongs to
this tradition of interpretation within which Spinozism is a synecdoche
for the radical Enlightenment project of the naturalization of authority,
and according to which Spinoza himself is but a duplicitous traitor—
allegedly, a Jew willing to scapegoat fellow Jews for attaching supersti-
tious importance to mere ritual, so as to reassure his contemporaries of
their self-appointed task to liberate humankind from traditional forms
of bondage.
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HODIE JUDAEI
The crux of Milner’s Spinoza work consists in the contention that hid-
den in plain sight within Spinoza’s TTP is a “manifesto” [TTP, Chapter
iii, §§53--56] where Spinoza puts forth a discussion of problems relating
to the persecution and survival of the Jewish people. Milner refers to
this so-called manifesto as the Hodie Judaei or “Today the Jews”
manifesto.
As the centerpiece of Milner’s analysis, it is important to first look
at the so-called manifesto. The passage comes near the end of a chapter
where Spinoza analyzes the “calling” [vocatio] or “election” [electio] of
the “Hebrews” or “Jews”:28
So today the Jews [hodie Judaei] have absolutely nothing which they
could attribute to themselves beyond all the Nations. It’s true also that
they have survived for many years, in spite of being scattered and
without a state. But that is nothing to wonder at [id minime mirum],
after they separated themselves so from all the nations [postquam se ab
omnibus nationibus ita separaverunt] that they have drawn the hatred of
all men against themselves [ut omnium odium in se converterint], not
only by having external customs contrary to the customs of the other
nations, but also by the sign of circumcision, which they maintain
most scrupulously [religiosissime]. Moreover, experience has already
taught that the hatred of the Nations has done much to preserve
them [nationum odium eos admodum conservet]. Previously, when the
King of Spain [rex Hispaniae olim] compelled the Jews either to accept
the Religion of the Kingdom or to go into exile, a great many Jews
accepted the Religion of the priests. But because all the privileges of
native Spaniards were granted to those who accepted that religion,
and they were thought worthy of all honors, they immediately [statim]
mixed themselves with the Spaniards. As a result, after a little while no
traces of them remained, nor any memory [ut pauco post tempore nullae
eorum reliquiae manserint neque ulla memoria]. Just the opposite hap-
pened to those whom the King of Portugal [rex Lusitanorum] com-
pelled to accept the religion of his state. Although they converted to
that religion, they always lived separated [separati] from everyone else,
presumably because he declared them unworthy of all honors. I think
the sign of circumcision is also so important in this matter that I am
persuaded that this one thing will preserve this Nation to eternity.
Indeed, if the foundations of their religion did not make their hearts
unmanly [eorum animos effoeminarent], I would absolutely believe that
someday, given the opportunity, they would set up their state again
[suum imperium iterum erecturos], and God would choose them anew [de
novo]. That’s how changeable human affairs are. We have another
excellent example of [the importance of a distinguishing mark in pre-
serving national identity] in the Chinese. They have most scrupulously
[religiosissime] kept a kind of tail [comma] on their head, by which they
separate themselves from everyone else. Thus separated, they have
preserved themselves for so many thousands of years that they far
surpass all other nations in antiquity. They have not always remained
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in charge of their state; but [attamen] they have regained it when it was
lost. Doubtless they will regain it again [iterum recuperabunt], when the
hearts of the Tartars [Tartarorum] begin to grow feeble from the neg-
ligence [socordia] and extravagant living of wealth.29
On a charitable and straightforward reading one finds two things
here. First, although the Jewish people have “nothing they could attrib-
ute to themselves beyond all Nations”—that is, they have not been cho-
sen by God in any special sense—they have been able to maintain their
national identity during the period of exile, in part due to certain na-
tional traits, like the rite of circumcision, and in part due to the hostility
of the world’s other nations. Second, given the right circumstances, the
Jewish people will eventually establish another state of their own. It
remains unspecified why the Jewish people strive to establish another
state. Spinoza thinks this political striving is built into the Jewish na-
tional character (or “ingenium”). Consequently, this political striving
will last for an indefinite amount of time, that is to say, so long as the
Jews exist. For the Jews, observance of the Torah’s commandments and
the creation and preservation of a political authority charged with
maintaining the conditions necessary for the rule of Torahnic law con-
stitute supreme duties.30 Thus, it is possible, if not probable, Spinoza
thinks, that the Jews may one day be presented with the opportunity to
rebuild their state. Echoing the TTP’s preface’s opening lines, Spinoza
writes: “That’s how changeable human affairs are.”31
Upon closer inspection of the text, however, serious problems be-
gin to surface. Consider the short passage that begins: “[. . .] previously
[olim], when the King of Spain [rex Hispaniae] compelled the Jews either
to accept the Religion of the Kingdom or to go into exile [. . .],” and
ends: “[. . .] after a little while [ut pauco post tempore] no traces of them
remained, nor any memory.”32 Why does Spinoza assert that “they [viz.,
Jews who accepted the Religion of the Kingdom, Roman Catholicism]
immediately [statim] mixed themselves with the Spaniards” thereby
enjoying “all the privileges of native Spaniards”? Furthermore, why
does Spinoza claim that “after a little while” nothing remained of the
Jews at all?
Spinoza’s use of the temporal markers “previously” [olim],
“immediately” [statim] and “after a little while” [pauco post tempore], ac-
companied by the absence of any indication of what time period in
Spanish history he is referring to exactly, make Spinoza’s discussion
obscure. It is likely that the King of Spain Spinoza is referring to is
Ferdinand II of Aragon, whose conquest of Granada in 1492 triggered
a wave of forced conversions of Jews and Muslims. However, even if,
charitably enough, we assume that Spinoza is referring here to the pe-
riod that “immediately” follows 1492, it is hard to imagine that Spinoza
believed that converted Jews or “New Christians” were at any point
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perfectly assimilated into Spanish society, as if the “Jewish Question”
only re-emerged, on Spinoza’s understanding, later in the sixteenth--
century.33 Moreover, if the limpieza de sangra or “purity of blood” stat-
utes, enforced by the Church and Kingdom, did gradually cement the
institutionalized persecution of converted Jews and their descendants
(the so-called marranos), it also simultaneously guaranteed that the
memory of the Jews lived on in the Iberian Peninsula. Moreover, in
Spinoza’s impassioned letter to Albert Burgh at the end of 1675, he
explicitly refers to the auto-da-fe of a Spanish Catholic who converted to
Judaism, Don Lope de Vera.34 So, why does Spinoza write something
about the situation of Jews in Spain that he could not have himself
believed to be true? Such considerations suggest that Spinoza is not
telling the whole story.35
Regrettably, Milner’s decision to analyze the “manifesto” in isola-
tion heightens the ambiguity and opacity of Spinoza’s discussion. Yet in
discussing the persecution and survival of the Jewish nation, the pas-
sage above is intended to elaborate on the discussion of Jewish election
in general, the subject of the chapter as a whole. Corrective remarks
about this chapter are thus in order, in particular with regards to
Spinoza’s theorization of divine election and his conception of the
origins of the ancient Hebrew state. I propose to briefly evince what
I take to be the genuine character of Spinoza’s latent hostility to Jewish
identity and political history in TTP, Chapter 3. I think going over this
material is important so as to better protect ourselves against Milner’s
more speculative accusations.
SPINOZA ON JEWISH IDENTITY AND POLITICAL HISTORY
As noted above, TTP, Chapter 3 purportedly consists in a clarification
of the history of the Hebrew people and the nature of “divine election,”
as per its title: “On the Calling of the Hebrews, And Whether the Gift of
Prophecy was peculiar to the Hebrews.” In the course of this discussion,
Spinoza asserts that:
The only thing which distinguishes one nation from one another [. . . .]
is the social order and the laws under which they live and by which
they are directed. So the Hebrew nation was not chosen by God be-
fore others because of its intellect or its peace of mind, but because of
its social order and the fortune by which it came to have a state, and
kept it for so many years.36
In virtue of the fact that nations are only distinguished by their respec-
tive laws and social orders, the Jewish nation is therefore just like any
other nation in terms of its “intellect” and “peace of mind.”37 It is not
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chosen or elected in any narrow respect, that is, with regards to its
“blessedness.” Establishing this—and its corollary, that the Jews are
not unusually gifted with prophetic powers—is Spinoza’s primary aim
in TTP, Chapter 3. However, for Spinoza, a nation can be chosen in
another, looser respect, viz., to the degree that it enjoys those temporal
advantages that come with living in a healthy political climate of legality
and security. So, Spinoza concedes that the Jews were once chosen after
all, though only by means of “God’s external aid” [Dei auxilium exter-
num], that is, by means of the unforeseeable, though determined,
“fortune” [fortuna] that buttressed their worldly well-being during the
period they enjoyed political unity or statehood.
In TTP, Chapter iii, §§7--15, Spinoza fleshes out this account of
what constitutes divine “election” and why the Jews were only the cho-
sen people so long as their state endured. He motivates this account by
appealing, on the one hand, to the claim that everything necessarily
follows from God, and on the other, to the claim that an important
difference resides between those things that can be useful to us and that
are contained within our nature, and those things which are external to
us but which can also be useful to us. For Spinoza, the means which lead
to “living securely and healthily” [secure, et sano corpore vivere] are
“chiefly placed in external things” [in rebus externis praecipue sita sunt].
In other words, if we live securely and healthily, this is due mostly to the
presence of favorable external conditions, not because of what is
“contained in human nature itself” [in ipsa humana natura continentur].
Access to clean water and good, tillable land are plausible candidates
for the sorts of things that Spinoza had in mind.
On Spinoza’s reasoning, it appears that a strong state is just another
thing that we can turn to which is outside of us and allows us to live
securely and healthily. This is odd. A state—unlike a stream of fresh wa-
ter—is not just waiting for us to come across it; rather, its creation and
upkeep depend on our input and, as such, a state appears to follow from
something “contained in human nature.” Perhaps Spinoza has in mind
external conditions that allow for the prosperity of a state, like an advan-
tageous geographical location or the presence of friendly neighbors. In
any case, for Spinoza, inasmuch as “the power of all natural things is
nothing but the power itself of God, through which alone all things hap-
pen and are determined” [TTP, Chapter iii, §9], the conditions that allow
for political well-being are dependent on God. Hence, Spinoza can infer
that insofar as matters were well-disposed so as to allow for the strength
of the Jewish state, it is true in a sense that God “chose” the Jewish people,
but only as God might any other people who enjoy living in a strong state.
Contrariwise, since “God’s internal aid” [Dei auxilium internum]
concerns whatever human nature can dispose of by its own power to
conserve its being, Spinoza asserts God cannot choose a nation in the
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narrow sense. As examples of that which human nature can do by its
own power to conserve its being, Spinoza evokes knowing things by
their first cause and mastering the passions. He claims that these pow-
ers “are contained in human nature itself. So acquiring them depends
chiefly on our power alone, or on the laws of human nature alone. For
this reason we must maintain, without qualification, that these gifts are
not peculiar to any nation, but have always been common to the whole
human race” [TTP, Chapter iii, §12]. It seems that, on Spinoza’s rea-
soning, since the ability to know things by their first causes and master
the passions is contained in human nature itself, which is everywhere
the same, the ability cannot be expressed in variable degrees by differ-
ent population groups or national multitudes.38
Yet Spinoza equivocates, for he further asserts that the most stable
state will be such in virtue of being “founded and directed by prudent
and vigilant men” [hominibus prudentibus, et vigilantibus fundatur, et dir-
igitur]. If anywhere in TTP, Chapter 3 a latent hostility towards Jewish
identity is expressed, it is here:
But to form and preserve a social order requires no small talent and
vigilance. So a social order which for the most part is founded and
directed by prudent and vigilant men [hominibus prudentibus, et vigi-
lantibus fundatur, et dirigitur] will be more secure, more stable, and less
subject to fortune. Conversely, if a social order is established by men
of untrained intelligence [rudis ingenii], it will depend for the most
part on fortune and will be less stable. If, in spite of this, it has lasted a
long time, it will owe this to the guidance of another, not to its own
guidance. Indeed, if it has overcome great dangers and matters have
turned out favorably for it, it will only be able to wonder at and revere
the guidance of God (i.e., insofar as God acts through hidden external
causes, but not insofar as he acts through human nature and the hu-
man mind). Since nothing has happened to it except what is
completely unexpected and contrary to opinion, this can even be con-
sidered to be really a miracle.39
Hence, if being prudent and vigilant depends on our own power,
since the power to be prudent or vigilant is contained in human nature,
we can infer that a state may last a long time and be endowed with
strong laws specifically because the people that found and direct it have
been chosen by God in the narrow sense, that is, because they enjoy a
disproportionate amount of “God’s internal aid.”
Now, Spinoza explicitly maintains “without qualification” [hac de
causa omnino statuendum est] that all nations enjoy equally the gift of
virtue. Spinoza presupposes in this line of reasoning that external con-
ditions are all that can favor health and security and that these are a
“gift of fortune” [dona fortunae]. Nonetheless, we have seen Spinoza also
suggest that states are less subject to fortune when their rulers exercise
greater vigilance in statecraft. Implicit here is the belief that some
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groups of people can possess traits that might make a state more suc-
cessful. Further, even though Spinoza holds that nations are only dis-
tinguishable by virtue of their laws and “social order” [ratione societatis]
and not by virtue of innate collective character traits, perhaps such
distinguishing features between nations depend, at least partly, on
acquired collective character traits, like collective and acquired habits
of political prudence. If pressed, Spinoza would likely reply that there
would have to be other, external factors whose presence or absence
would acount for the success in statecraft of the collective in question,
as we have seen. Still, the consequence appears to be that a strong social
order and the presence of the rule of law can at least partly follow from
features of human nature that allow for its preservation in being by its
power alone.40
Continuing in the same vein, Spinoza alludes to the period of the
Jews’ exodus from Egypt. Spinoza claims that if the “social order” has
been “established by men of untrained intelligence [rudis ingenii],” its
well-being is due to external circumstance alone, and so, it is normal
that such men “wonder at and revere the guidance of God.”41 Spinoza
further asserts that the “Israelites,” when they were led out of Egypt by
Moses, were “worn out by the most wretched bondage” and
“uneducated” or “crass” [rudes].42 Moses is thus credited by Spinoza
with having known how to adapt a strong constitutional system to the
“untrained intelligence” of the Jewish people, which meant treating
them as children.43 Therefore, even if a state could be powerful because
the people who constitute it enjoy God’s “internal aid”—that is, even if
per impossibile a people could be chosen by God—Spinoza consistently
maintains that nothing about the historic success of the Jewish state
follows from Jewish national traits.
This problematic view constitutes the content of Spinoza’s latent
hostility to Jewish identity and political history in TTP, Chapter 3.
Elsewhere in the TTP, Spinoza will nuance this attitude by zeroing-in
on the allegedly dangerous role that religious authorities have played in
Jewish history and how they putatively failed to keep the public interest
in mind.44 I will bracket this discussion, however, and now return
to Milner’s interpretation to show how, in contrast, he construes the
nature of Spinoza’s “anti-Judaism.”
INTERPRETING SPINOZA’S MOTTO, CAUTE
Milner is not interested in the issues raised by TTP, Chapter 3 as a
whole, nor whether these are involved in the “manifesto.” For his
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part, Milner justifies his approach by couching it in an examination of
Spinoza’s famed signet ring:
As a choice of method [. . . .] I will treat the extract like a separable
Manifesto. [. . . .] With regards to my method of reading it [. . . .] this
depends on a hypothesis about Spinoza’s art of writing. As a matter of
fact, it depends on an understanding of his motto, Caute.45
Most often, Milner notes, the adverb “caute” is held as implying an
ellipsis of some verb phrase it qualifies. Therefore, we are to read the
motto not as signifying “prudently” (or, on another translation,
“moderately”) but, more specifically, as signifying “act with prudence”
or “read with prudence.” But Milner thinks that we can just as well take
it to be a practice in brachylogy, as if the motto deliberately omits some
word or words which are implied by it and explain its meaning. So, for
Milner, the complete formula is “si non caste, tamen caute”: “if not in a
chaste manner, at least in a prudent manner.” That which is “non caste”
is that which any given society finds indecent. Milner notes that this
formula can be traced back to the eleventh century, to Adalbert of
Hamburg, and it was, to believe Milner, widely known in the seven-
teenth century.
In fact, Milner thinks that his interpretation of “caute” is corrobo-
rated by an interpretation of the nature of Spinoza’s emblem, the rose,
which is intended, according to Milner, to both play on the meaning of
Spinoza’s own name (“espinosa,” “thorny”) as well as the ancient Latin
expression concerning that which is said “sub rosa”, that is, in secret. In
both cases, Milner believes, we see that Spinoza is asking to be read
esoterically, specifically because he will say something that is “non caste”
or indecent, something “thorny” and unpleasant.
Unsurprisingly, Milner calls on Leo Strauss to justify this method of
reading. Strauss canonically defines his theory of “the art of writing” in
the following terms: “If a master of the art of writing commits such
blunders as would shame an intelligent school boy, it is reasonable to
assume they are intentional, especially if the author discusses, however
incidentally, the possibility of intentional blunders in writing.”46
The pitfalls of the “esoteric reading” are patent. If we take it that a
writer is not committed to his/her explicit statements, then we allow
ourselves to read into the writer as making any claim we like, willy-nilly.
Most scholarly work on Spinoza today does not embrace Straussianism.
Still, the temptation to do so lingers on. Take, for instance, Spinoza’s
assertion at the end of TTP, Chapter 2 that “Christ” possesses
“superhuman wisdom.” Spinoza then meekly notes that he does not
wish to speak about what certain churches have to say on this matter,
since he does not “grasp” their positions. Because we know that
Spinoza lived in a Christian environment, and because Spinoza’s talk
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of “superhuman wisdom” smacks of bad faith, we infer that Spinoza is
not committed to his explicit statements and is being forced by circum-
stance to say something that has an exoteric function.
Straussianism takes on an outsized role in Milner’s work. It allows
him to secure the central premise of his argument that Spinoza is in-
tentionally obfuscating readers for reasons of public decorum, if not
personal safety. The Straussian belief that the exoteric function of a text
serves to cloak its esoteric meaning shores up the view that Spinoza’s
explicit analysis of Jewish identity and national political history only
serves to lead us astray from the true matters at stake. Again, it is dif-
ficult to refute a Straussian. What further evidence can be marshaled in
favor of one interpretation of the text as opposed to another, if all
interpretations of explicit textual material fall short of the analysis of
implicit esoteric meaning?
ON “HATRED OF THE NATIONS” AND THE IMITATION OF THE
AFFECTS IN SPINOZA
Let us further unpack Milner’s reading of the “manifesto.” My aim in
what follows is to present Milner’s arguments, show where he goes
astray, and correct him when necessary. The first piece of textual evi-
dence Milner will draw attention to in the “manifesto” is the short
passage that begins: “[. . . .] it’s true also that they [viz., “the Jews”]
have survived for many years, in spite of being scattered and without
a state [. . . .],” and that ends: “experience has already taught that the
hatred of the Nations has done much to preserve them [nationum odium
eos admodum conservet] [. . .].”47
For Milner, Spinoza is claiming not only that the “survival” of the
Jews is due to “the hatred of the Nations,” but that the Jews themselves
are responsible for the hatred of the Nations. In the brief evocation of
the history of Jewish persecution that Spinoza gives, Milner claims,
Spinoza is treating the Jews as the primary agent of this history. The
Jews “separated themselves” with contrary external customs and the
sign of circumcision, just as the Jews “have drawn the hatred of the
Nations against themselves.” On Milner’s reading, the fact that the Jews
are the subject of the reflexive verb clauses (“se ita separaverunt” and “in
se converterint”) suggests, for Spinoza, that it is the Jews who are at fault
for being hated. To make his case, Milner draws on an important pas-
sage from TTP, Chapter 17:
So the love of the Hebrews for their country was not a simple love, but
piety [pietas]. Their daily worship so encouraged and fed this piety,
and this hatred of other nations, that [these affects] had to become a
part of their nature. For the daily worship was not only completely
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different from that of the other nations (which made them altogether
individual and completely separated from the others), but also abso-
lutely contrary to it. That daily condemnation [of foreigners] had to
produce a continual hatred; no other hatred could be lodged more
firmly in their hearts than this. As is natural, no hatred can be greater
or more stubborn than one born of great devotion or piety, and be-
lieved to be pious [utpote odium ex magna devotione seu pietate ortum,
quodque pium credebatur, quo sane nullum majos nec pertinacius dari pot-
est]. And they did not lack the usual cause which invariably inflames
hatred more and more: its reciprocation. For the other nations were
bound to hate them most savagely in return.48
On Milner’s understanding, Spinoza is setting up a more exact descrip-
tion of how it is that the hatred of the Nations preserved the Jews and
why, for Spinoza, they are thus responsible for the hatred of the
Nations, viz., the Jewish “daily worship” was accompanied by the “daily
condemnation of foreigners” and this gave rise to a hatred that was
reciprocated. Once more, the fact that “foreigners” are said to be only
“reciprocating” lends plausibility to Milner’s reading that Spinoza holds
that the Jews are themselves responsible for the hatred they experience.
To see why Spinoza holds that hatred reciprocates hatred, it suffices to
briefly turn to his Ethics:
He who imagines he is hated by someone, and believes he has given
the other no cause for hate, will hate the other in return. [3p40]
He who imagines someone to be affected with hate will thereby also
be affected with hate (by 3p27), i.e. (by 3p13s), with Sadness accom-
panied by the idea of an external cause. But (by hypothesis) he ima-
gines no cause of this Sadness except the one who hates him. So from
imagining himself to be hated by someone, he will be affected with
Sadness, accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him [as a
cause of the sadness] or (by the same scholium) he will hate the other,
QED. [3p40d]
Spinoza’s argument in the demonstration to E3p40 appeals to the
principle of the imitation of the affects articulated at E3p27: when we
encounter another person for the first time, we are naturally inclined to
imitate their affective state. So, if we encounter someone who hates us,
spontaneously, we will enter the same affective state. We will therefore
also feel hatred, and since hatred is a form of sadness, we are saddened.
But, by the hypothesis, we will not “imagine” there to be any cause of this
sadness other than the person whose affect we are imitating and who we
have just encountered; and so, Spinoza believes, we will not just feel
hatred in general but we will hate that particular person, that is, want
to eliminate the source of sadness. Thus hatred reciprocates hatred.
Hence, it is in keeping with his general psychological views that
Spinoza holds that insofar as one nation hates another, it will be hated
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in return, though it would appear that, for Spinoza, the issue of “who
hated who first” is anything but relevant. Milner’s contention is specif-
ically that in the case of the Jews, Spinoza maintains that they are the
instigators of reciprocated hatred. His evidence hinges on his construal
of the implicit meaning of Spinoza’s use of reflexive verb clauses in the
“manifesto,” along with Spinoza’s description of the state of Jewish
“piety” in the ancient Hebrew state. But Milner thinks there is even
more at work in the manifesto, for he believes that Spinoza is further
implying that the hatred will persist so long as does the Jewish nation
itself, since the Jewish nation is allegedly responsible for the hatred.
Thus, Milner writes:
The hatred of Jews by non-Jews keeps the Jews in existence. [. . . .] It
will endure so long as lasts the machine of hatred, of which the pri-
mary cog is not hatred, but the saddening rites which produce hatred.
[. . . .] Spinoza’s reasoning is built on the affirmation that hatred,
rather than destroying the people that instigates it, maintains the peo-
ple that instigates it. (Tout le raisonnement repose sur l’affirmation que la
haine, loin de detruire le peuple qui la suscite, le maintient.)49
The final sentence is significant. Milner would have us believe that
Spinoza’s core claim is that the Jewish nation “instigates” [suscite] the
hatred that preserves it. It is at this point that Milner’s reading deviates
towards conjecture and speculation. It is not clear what leads Milner to
think that Spinoza is not only holding the Jewish nation responsible for
its persecution but that, moreover, we should be on the lookout for
Spinoza’s solution to the problem of persecution. It is not clear why the
question and its answer would need to be hidden from a majority
Christian audience more or less accustomed to antisemitism, whether
religious or secular. Above all, it is not clear why Milner overlooks what
even the casual reader of the TTP sees, that Spinoza systematically
distinguishes between the Jewish nation as a whole and the clerical
aristocracy that Spinoza believes usurped authority to its own ends,
the so-called Pharisees.50
THE ALLEGED SECRET BEHIND SPINOZA’S HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
The historical examples in the “manifesto” play key roles in Milner’s
interpretation of Spinoza’s effort at dissimulating his views. Thus,
Milner focuses on another piece of textual evidence from the so-
called manifesto, the passage that begins: “[. . . .] previously [olim],
when the King of Spain [rex Hispaniae] compelled the Jews either to
accept the Religion of the Kingdom or to go into exile [. . . .],” and ends:
“[. . . .] although they converted to that religion, they always lived
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separated [separati] from everyone else, presumably because he de-
clared them unworthy of all honors.”51
Spinoza, claims Milner, is intending his reader to draw two over-
lapping conclusions from the consideration of the Spanish and
Portuguese histories. In the case of Spain, the conversos are seen as
“worthy of all honors.” In the case of Portugal, the conversos are kept
“separate” and declared “unworthy of all honors.” Hence, Milner sug-
gests that we are meant to conclude that the mechanism of hatred
remains intact in Portugal, since it is the mechanism of hatred that
preserves the Jews, unlike in Spain, where the mechanism of hatred
has been dismantled, thereby leading to the “mixing” of the popula-
tions. Moreover, according to Milner, we are to understand that a suc-
cessful state must be governed by a dispassionate ruler. On Milner’s
account, this is why Spinoza writes about “the King of Spain” as op-
posed to “the King of the Portuguese.” The subtle shift in nomencla-
ture suggests a shift in meaning; the former is a well-constituted
imperium; the latter, though ruled, is not so unified. To be a good state,
Milner infers, passions must not direct the course of its governance.
The King of the Portuguese did not master his passions. In his hatred,
he kept the existence of the Jews intact by keeping them apart. “The
Portuguese” do not become “Portugal.”52
Milner claims that the King of Spain being hinted at here is none
other than Ferdinand II of Aragon. He likewise believes that Spinoza
would have been aware of Machiavelli’s celebration of Ferdinand in The
Prince, where Ferdinand II is lauded for “hunting down” and “driving
out” the “marrani” under the pretext of religion.53 However, Milner
passes over in silence Spinoza’s own discussion of Ferdinand II in
TP, Chapter vii, where Spinoza does assert that the Aragonese, “threw
off the yoke of slavery to the Moors [Maurorum],” though what Spinoza
himself is particularly keen to underline there is that the Spanish im-
perium was strong because of its constitutionally sound nature that
allowed for a separation of powers.54
Milner believes that his considerations suggest that Spinoza’s ap-
peal to the Spanish example is intended to alert the reader to the ideal
way of dealing with the situation of Jews in Europe:
It is possible for a political authority to erase any trace of the Jews, on
the condition that its decision owes nothing to hatred. Thus is deter-
mined the ideal type of what we can call perfect persecution
(lapersecution parfaite).55
“Perfect persecution” is efficacious. It does away once and for all
with the object of persecution, but it can only do this if it is not moti-
vated by hatred. This is supposedly the lesson of the Spanish example.
Milner then turns to the Chinese example. He claims that Spinoza is
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willfully saying something the opposite of which he knows to be true as
a means of alerting his careful reader to his hidden intentions.
Briefly put, Spinoza and his readers would have had access to lim-
ited testimony about the customs of the Chinese. A precious source of
information was Jesuit Martino Martini’s De Bello Tartarico Historia
[Antwerp: 1654]. Martini describes the conquest of the Ming dynasty
by the Tartars in 1644, as well as the Chinese resistance to the Tartar
conquest. We see that Spinoza is relying on testimony from Martini
because: the Mongol period of rule (1279--1368) is considered by
Martini to have been a Tartar rule, and the Chinese, according to
Martini, regained their state after having already lost it once to the
Tartars; and Martini recounts that the Tartars lost control because of
the luxurious lifestyle they embraced once in Beijing. Yet Martini
relates that the “tail” or comma (the hairpiece) was a practice borrowed
by the Chinese from the Tartars, contrary to what Spinoza suggests.
Thus, Spinoza produces a “counter-truth” intended for his most alert
audiences. That is to say, for Milner, Spinoza is making a coded evoca-
tion to the handicap imposed on the Chinese by the ruling Tartars, who
were at the time, according to Martini, converting to Christianity.
The use of the term “religiosissime” (“most religiously”) to describe
the behavior of the Chinese with respect to the hairpiece they wear is
also meant to be a clue in this mystery. As with the Jews and the sign of
circumcision, the Chinese hairpiece is allegedly part of their identity.
This entails, for Milner, that the Chinese example is being used by
Spinoza to suggest that reconquering their own state means abandon-
ing the hairpiece and with it a religion of foreign bondage. However, in
the case of the Jews, it is their own religion that is sapping them of their
strength, not a foreign religion against which they will rebel. By trans-
position, Milner believes, Spinoza is insinuating that the sign of circum-
cision must be abandoned, so that the Jews can have the strength to
reestablish a state. Yet this is impossible, since without the sign of cir-
cumcision, the Jewish nation would cease to exist. Consequently, claims
Milner, this suggests that the solution consists, for Spinoza, in divorcing
the sign of circumcision from the Jewish religion, so that the nation can
be kept without the religion. On Milner’s reading, the Chinese experi-
ence thus, “deals with questions that were not openly asked: to what
degree do the principles of a given religion enslave the nation that
adopts the religion? To what degree can the abandonment of a religion
favor the independence of a nation?”56
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SPINOZA AND SABBATAI ZEVI
The final phase of Milner’s interpretation consists in his discussion of
Sabbatai Zevi (1626--76). Considering the dramatic use to which Milner
puts Zevi’s apostasy to Islam in Constantinople in 1666, let us begin by
noting what little information we actually have about Spinoza’s relation
to Zevi, before then also evidencing what Spinoza actually thought of
the Ottoman Empire.
Zevi’s movement is mentioned once in connection with Spinoza’s
writing, in a letter Spinoza receives from Henry Oldenburg (December
1665 [Ep. 33]). Oldenburg enquires as to Spinoza’s views, writing that
there is, “a rumor on everyone’s lips, that the Israelites, who have been
scattered for more than two thousand years, will return to their Native
Land. Few here believe this, though many desire it.” Oldenburg writes
that he is, “eager to know what the Jews in Amsterdam have heard
about this matter, and how they are affected by such an important
report, which, if it should be true, seems that it will lead to a sudden
Overturning of everything in the World.”
Indeed, there was considerable agitation in Amsterdam in 1665
when Zevi rose to stardom. Led by the messianic fervor of the com-
munity’s chief rabbi, Rabbi Aboab, some members of the community
began selling their property in preparation to leave for the Promised
Land, while others named their children after Zevi or planned to ex-
hume the dead to bring them along for the trip.57 Spinoza was likely
aware of this agitation and later got wind of Zevi’s apostasy in the
Ottoman Empire in 1666. We do not have Spinoza’s response to
Oldenburg, but it is unlikely Spinoza would have had much sympathy
for Zevi’s followers.
The “Turks” do play a role in Spinoza’s political theory, though a
negative one. For instance, in his Political Treatise, Spinoza writes: “no
state has stood so long without notable change as that of the Turks. On
the other hand, none have been less lasting than popular, or
Democratic states. Nowhere else have there been so many rebellions.
Still, if slavery, barbarism, and being without protection are to be called
peace, nothing is more wretched for men than peace” [TP, Chapter vi,
§4]. Spinoza appeals to the “Turks” in order to distinguish his own view
on strong statehood from mere tyranny.58 Hence, though the state’s
stability is important, this is only true to a degree, the upper limit being
associated with terror, at which point the state ceases to fulfill its func-
tion as providing the ground for the cultivation of common goods such
as the freedom to philosophize.
Milner has something different in mind, for he claims that Zevi’s
apostasy and forced embrace of Ottoman authority plays an essential
role in Spinoza’s “manifesto,” allegedly allowing Spinoza to articulate a
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way out of an impasse, viz., that Jewish identity is maintained by the sign
of circumcision, but the Jewish religion, of which circumcision is an
integral part, is making the Jews “unmanly” and thus incapable of un-
dertaking the political action necessary to rebuild a state:
[. . . .] Circumcision will allow for the reconquest; the principles of the
Jewish religion block the reconquest. The contradiction is flagrant,
since circumcision is a part of the religion. [. . . .] Converting to
Islam, Sabbatai Zevi reunites the two requirements that appeared ir-
reconcilable; he maintains circumcision, while also abandoning the
principles of the Jewish religion. In this way, circumcision changes
meaning. Once a sad and isolationist rite, so long as it was a part of
an isolationist religion, it becomes the means to assimilate to an or-
dered society within a powerful and prosperous kingdom. (Rite
separateur et lugubre, tant qu’elle ressortissant d’une religion separatrice,
elle devient moyen d’assimilation au sein d’une societe ordonnee, dans un
royaume puissant et prospe`re.)[. . . .] For the Jews hoping to obtain a
territory, Spinoza indicates the path to follow: imitate Sabbatai Zevi.
More exactly, imitate his apostasy, not his messianism.59
On Milner’s view, Sabbatai Zevi is the Spinozistic deus ex machina.
With Zevi, the Jews are henceforth in a position to regain a homeland,
though to do this they must abandon their religion and embrace Islam.
How is this meant to respond to the “hatred of the Nations”?
Milner’s argument, alas, remains obscure. Perhaps his line of rea-
soning runs something like this. In abandoning the Jewish religion, the
signification of circumcision metamorphizes. It can still be maintained
in Islam but it will no longer set the Jews apart and draw the hatred of
the nations to them. Likewise, since the Jewish religion is tied to the
legal commands it encourages obedience to, presumably the abandon-
ment of the religion within the bounds of a strong polity satisfies the
religious yearning to rebuild a state. Hence, “perfect persecution” con-
sists in the (questionably) voluntary mass apostasy of the Jews under the
leadership of a Sabbatai Zevi-like figure such that, within the bounds set
by an Islamic polity, the Jewish people satisfy their historic longing to
rebuild a state. Milner then asserts that this is keeping with the Spanish
lesson, viz., hatred cannot motivate the political entity that carries out
the task of eliminating a source of hatred. His account thus comes full
circle: Spinoza not only diagnoses the nature of the persecution of the
Jewish people, but further advances a solution to the problem.
But there is a loose end in this account. What of Spinoza himself, a
Jew by birth and education? According to Milner, Spinoza’s performa-
tive break with Judaism is observable in his implicit swearing of fidelity
to the terms of the credo minimum articulated in TTP, Chapter xiv (the
so-called “catholic” or “universal” religion, with its seven simple articles
of faith that encourage obedience to the cult of justice and charity). The
credo, avers Milner, is willfully irreconcilable with Judaism. On Milner’s
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understanding of Spinoza’s views, Judaism is marked by observance to
mere ritual, such as the rite of circumcision, from which it cannot be
divorced, while Christianity, especially Protestantism, would be more
amenable to the credo minimum Milner writes:
Two cases are considered. Either the Jews want to free themselves
from hatred, and accept that they will not have their own state. Or
the Jews want to free themselves from hatred, and reconstruct their
state. For the former, they must accept the end of circumcision. [. . . .]
For the latter, they must renounce their religious principles, while
conserving circumcision.[. . . .] The manifesto does not speak of the
wise man. [. . . .] This is the third apostasy, which we can call the wise
man’s apostasy.[. . . .] In principle, we can resume it as follows: re-
nounce Judaism, and convert to the universal religion; as a matter
of fact, this means adopting a slightly purified form of
Christianity.[. . . .] The wise man can and must make a choice. He
can, because the only thing that matters to him is the universal reli-
gion. Organized religions are, properly speaking, meaningless in his
eyes. But he must make a choice, because organized religions are not
equal amongst themselves. Some are especially incompatible with the
universal religion, others less so. Judaism belongs to the first category,
Roman Catholicism as well.60
We are left with the image of Spinoza as confronted by the neces-
sity of making do with what is at hand: Protestant Christianity.
Spinoza’s veiled approval of the ultimate political upshot of Sabbatai
Zevi’s apostasy, and his understanding of the unique opportunity pre-
sented by the mass conversion of the Jewish people to Islam in resolv-
ing once and for all the perennial hatred generated by the Jewish
nation, is thus accompanied by his own personal and disingenuous
embrace of a religion that, still, has the advantage of being relatively
less irrational and superstitious than Judaism.
CONCLUSION
For Milner, Spinoza is a distant mirror of the present because Spinoza’s
“anti-Judaism” prefigures current forms of antisemitism. Spinoza’s hos-
tility to Judaism grows out of a desire to put an end to the hatred that
one recalcitrant nation generates. Milner alleges that it is for this reason
that it can resonate so strongly in Western societies today. Hence,
Spinoza’s persecutory program is especially pernicious. Milner’s aim
would be to alert naı¨ve readers to the bitter truth:
The perfect erasure of the Jews must be accomplished without hatred
and it must be bloodless.[. . . .] Since the Jewish name passes for the
greatest troublemaker that history has produced, they [read:
contemporaries sympathetic to this belief] suppose that with its
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abolition, hatred will be extinguished. [. . . .] They are indignant that a
name so old takes so long to disappear. They despair and hope at the
same time. The Hodie Judaie manifesto should reassure them, because
it will reign. But at the cost of a metamorphosis. The rigorous and
difficult text will become like an aerosol opinion. For a long time
celebrated by people who had not understood him, Spinoza will
soon be perfectly understood by people who have not read him.
Drunk on the emanations of the perfect persecution, the Spinozists
will crowd themselves in the alleys of populous and soft parks. But
they will not know they are Spinozists. (Longtemps loue par des gens qui
ne l’avaient pas compris, Spinoza sera bientoˆt parfaitement compris par des
gens qui ne l’auront pas lu. Enivres aux effluves de la persecution parfaite, les
spinozistes se presseront en foule, dans les allees du parc populeux et douillet.
Sauf qu’ils ne sauront pas qu’ils sont spinozistes.)61
The image of a populous park of genuine Spinozists who under-
stand Spinoza without having read him brings Milner’s nightmarish
fairytale to an end. So much for Spinoza scholarship if, at the end of
the day, only his persecutory program enters the mainstream.
The implications Milner draws could not be more unpleasant.
Spinoza’s TTP, and his alleged covert theorization of a means to resolve
the so-called Jewish Question once and for all, presciently foreshadows
the worst contemporary developments. The recent swell of fascist pop-
ulism stands at the horizon of Milner’s account. Similarly, that the al-
legedly Spinozistic political solution to the hatred generated by the
recalcitrant Jewish nation consists in something analogous to Zevi’s
apostasy to Islam has unpleasant overtones, as Milner must know, in
light of the Israeli--Palestinian conflict and its controversial status in
Europe.
What lessons can be drawn from such a far-fetched account of
Spinoza? Historians and philosophers will likely be astonished, and
probably remain unconvinced, by Milner’s allegations. To be fair,
Milner’s account contributes, in its own way, to Spinoza literature.
Milner’s analysis of Spinoza’s motto, caute, is informative. The claim
that Spinoza’s knowledge of recent Chinese history is transmitted by
Martini is compelling. Lastly, Milner’s limpid, Delphic writing is unde-
niably seductive, for better or worse.
Putting aside its redeeming insights, which perhaps may be disso-
ciated from the broader account Milner maintains, Milner’s Spinoza
book is primarily interesting not for what it tells us about Spinoza
per se, but rather because it sheds light on how Spinoza scholarship
is imbued with tensions stemming from the contemporary European
political and social context. Upon close analysis, Milner’s work pos-
sesses a very questionable first-order value at best, but its second-
order value as a historical document in its own right remains relatively
intact.
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As I have shown, Milner’s account is bewildering, and thus implau-
sible. It asks too much of its reader. An overarching weakness in
Milner’s account results from his embrace of Strauss’ esoteric reading
method, and the manner in which this method precludes the falsifiabil-
ity of its claims in light of what would be contradictory textual material.
Another flaw stems from its lack of interest with regard to textual ma-
terial. As historians of philosophy know, this easily leads to the distor-
tion of authorial intentions and motivations. With regards to what
Milner’s reading teaches us about Spinoza’s motivations, it affords us,
at best, the opportunity to examine Spinoza’s hostile insinuations con-
cerning the nature and history of Judaism. Nonetheless, Milner is not
entitled to maintain that Spinoza is programmatically “anti-Jewish.”
However, Milner’s hyper-ideological interpretation remains fasci-
nating, joining the ranks of other contextually significant readings of
Spinoza. By today’s academic standards, these often appear to be out-
dated and poorly motivated accounts of the history of seventeenth-
century philosophy. Fortunately, they can still always be studied as
artifacts in a contextualized history of the heated controversies that
have surrounded, and continued to surround, Spinoza’s status as the
preeminent Jewish thinker of the Enlightenment.
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NOTES
1. Jean-Claude Milner, Le sage trompeur: Libres raisonnements sur
Spinoza et les juifs. Court traite de lecture 1 [The Wise Trickster: Free
Thoughts on Spinoza and the Jews. Short Interpretation 1] (Paris, 2013).
All translations are my own.
2. Jean-Claude Milner (b. 1941), normalien and Professor Emeritus of
Linguistics at the Universite Paris 7 Denis Diderot, is something of a public
intellectual in his native country. He belongs to the generation of academic
philosophers who professed adherence to Maoism in 1968. Following the
publication of Jean-Claude Milner, Les penchants criminels de l’Europe
democratique [Criminal Inclinations in Democratic Europe] (Paris, 2003),
Milner’s analysis of antisemitism’s various expressions, or what he consid-
ers the contentious role of “le nom juif” in universalist political theories, has
taken center stage in his recent work. Milner has also published volumes
about Chomskyan linguistics, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and French literary
criticism.
3. The best biography of Spinoza is Steven Nadler, Spinoza: A Life,
2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2018).
4. On the issue of Spinoza’s “evil opinions and acts,” see Steven
Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind (New York,
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2004). According to Nadler, the “evil opinion” consists in Spinoza’s rejec-
tion of the immortality of the soul. For an alternate, literary presentation of
Spinoza’s herem that emphasizes Spinoza’s alleged effort to have the mu-
nicipal authorities of Amsterdam annul the debts he inherited from his
father’s import/export business, see Maxime Rove`re, Le clan Spinoza:
Amsterdam, 1677. L’invention de la liberte [The Spinoza Clan: Amsterdam,
1677. The Invention of Freedom] (Paris, 2017).
5. In Le sage trompeur, Milner uses the term “anti-Judaism” rather than
antisemitism. In Alain Badiou and Jean-Claude Milner, Controverse: Dialogue
sur la politique et la philosophie de notre temps [Controversy: Dialogue on
Politics and the Philosophy of Our Age], edited by Philippe Petit (Paris,
2012), p. 190 et seq., Milner explains his preference for the term “anti-
Judaism” when analyzing the nature of current expressions of hostility to
Judaism, the Jewish people, and Israel, in the European context. According
to Milner, one crucial difference concerns the fact that contemporary “anti-
Judaism” does not make the same use of racializing categories. Rather, it
betrays a fixation with the function of “the Jewish name” (le nom juif). Thus,
Milner considers antisemitism as more properly belonging to prewar
Europe. However, it remains clear that “anti-Judaism” represents, in his
eyes, a contemporary variation on the same theme as antisemitism, namely
the scapegoating of Jews.
6. All English-language citations from the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
[hereafter: TTP] and Spinoza’s other works come from Baruch Spinoza,
The Collected Works, 2 vols., edited by Edwin Curley (Princeton, 1985 and
2016). Latin-language references to ‘G’ stand for Baruch Spinoza, Opera, 4
vols., edited by Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg, 1925). Hence, ‘TTP, ch. iii, §53’
gives the chapter and paragraph numbers for Curley’s edition, and ‘G III
56’ gives the volume and page number for Gebhardt’s edition. When ap-
propriate, line references to the Gebhardt edition are given by ‘ll.’ ‘E’,
followed by the conventional indicators for Part, Definition, Axiom,
Proposition, Demonstration, Scholium, etc., refers to Spinoza’s Ethics.
‘Ep.’ refers to Spinoza’s Letters. ‘TP’ refers to Spinoza’s Political Treatise.
7. See Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the
Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 (New York, 2001). According to Israel, ad-
herence to the radical Enlightenment project can be described as the twin
belief in democratic republicanism and in the need to separate religious
and secular powers. Israel further claims that the impetus behind the rad-
ical Enlightenment can be found in Spinoza, who, as Israel shows, was
widely debated in the period.
8. For a history of Judaism and the Jews in the Enlightenment and
how this became “the key site of intellectual contestation, confusion, and
debate,” see Adam Sutcliffe, Judaism and Enlightenment (Cambridge, UK,
2003). Quote is on p. 5.
9. See: Laurent Bove, “Le manifeste anti-juif de Spinoza : Reflexions
sur la fabrication d’un faux” [Spinoza’s Anti-Jewish Manifesto: Reflections
on the Fabrication of a Falsehood], La Revue des Livres, Vol. 13 (2013), pp.
4--12; Ivan Segre, The Ethics of an Outlaw, trans. David Broder (London,
2017); Ivan Segre, Judaı¨sme et revolution [Judaism and Revolution] (Paris,
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2014); and Philippe Drieux, “Le sage trompeur” [The Wise Trickster],
Bulletin de bibliographie spinoziste XXXVI, Archives de Philosophie, Vol. 77,
No. 4 (2014), pp. 721--45. Segre’s work stands out for its attempt to make
sense of the broader issues at stake. According to Segre, Milner’s Spinoza
commentary should be construed as belonging to a tradition of
“bourgeois” (read: politically reactionary) Judaism that has only recently
gained traction in France. In his Judaı¨sme et revolution, Segre further
addresses the recent history of politically conservative strands of Jewish
thought in France. Not all reactions to Milner were hostile. See Charles
Ramond, “Peut-on persecuter un nom? Jean-Claude Milner lecteur de
Spinoza” [Can One Persecute a Name? Jean-Claude Milner Reader of
Spinoza], in Spinoza contemporain: Philosophie, ethique, politique
[Contemporary Spinoza: Philosophy, Ethics, Politics], edited by Charles
Ramond (Paris, 2016). The heated controversy surrounding Le sage trom-
peur even reached the non-academic public via a radio debate on France
Culture between Laurent Bove and Milner, Spinoza, les juifs et la modernite
[Spinoza, The Jews, and Modernity], moderated by Alain Finkielkraut,
available online at: https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/repliques/spi-
noza-les-juifs-et-la-modernite.
10. For example, Alexandre Matheron, Le Christ et le salut des ignorants
[Christ and the Salvation of the Ignorant] (Paris, 1974) and Bernard
Pautrat’s introduction to Jarig Jelles, Preface aux Oeuvres posthumes de
Spinoza [Preface to Spinoza’s Posthumous Works] [1677], trans. Bernard
Pautrat (Paris, 2017). Pautrat draws attention to the systematic
Christianization of Spinoza in the preface to the Opera posthuma.
Suggestively, the preface does not make a single reference to Spinoza’s
Jewish background.
11. Prominent exceptions include: Sylvain Zac, L’idee de vie dans la
philosophie de Spinoza [The Idea of Life in Spinoza’s Philosophy] (Paris,
1963) and Sylvain Zac, Spinoza et l’interpretation de l’Ecriture [Spinoza and
the Interpretation of Scripture] (Paris, 1965); Genevie`ve Brykman, La
judeite de Spinoza [Spinoza’s Jewishness] (Paris, 1975); Catherine Chalier,
Spinoza lecteur de Maı¨monide: La question theologico-politique [Spinoza Reader
of Maimonides: The Theologico-Political Question] (Paris, 2006); and
Gilles Hanus, Sans images ni paroles: Spinoza face a la revelation [Without
Images or Words: Spinoza Confronting Revelation] (Paris, 2018).
12. The tradition of English-language interpretations emphasizing
Spinoza’s debt to (Medieval) Judaism can be traced back to Harry
Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes
of His Reasoning, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1934). For more, see Steven
Nadler (ed.), Spinoza and Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge, UK,
2014). Nadler’s introduction helpfully unravels the history of interpreta-
tions of Spinoza’s Judaism. Many contributors to Yitzhak Y. Melamed and
Michael A. Rosenthal (eds.), Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise: A Critical
Guide (Cambridge, UK, 2010) also advance nuanced discussions of
Spinoza’s Judaism. See also the papers in Heidi Ravven and Lenn
Goodmann (eds.), Jewish Themes in Spinoza’s Philosophy (Albany, NY, 2002).
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13. Emmanuel Levinas, Difficile liberte (Paris, 2006), p. 155 et seq. For a
recent discussion of Levinas’ accusation, see Michael L. Morgan, “Spinoza’s
Afterlife in Judaism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza, edited by Michael
Della Rocca (New York, 2017), pp. 595--99. Morgan maintains that Levinas’
later writings on Spinoza show that he ultimately adopted a more moderate
attitude.
14. On Spinoza’s alleged Christian supersessionism, consider TTP, ch.
xiv, §§24--28. Espousing the view that “the whole law” consists in the com-
mand to love one’s neighbor, and that the “fundamental principles” es-
poused by “the whole of Scripture” concern nothing but justice and
charity, Spinoza enumerates what is to be the doctrinal content of the
genuine “catholic” (or “universal”) faith, obedience to which is both nec-
essary and sufficient for effectively implementing the moral command to
love one’s neighbor. On the issue of Christian supersessionism in relation
to Spinoza’s view on circumcision, see Michael A. Rosenthal, “Spinoza on
Circumcision and Ceremonies,” Modern Judaism, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2016), pp.
42--66.
15. Milner returns to analyzing what he considers to be the pernicious-
ness of universalism in Jean-Claude Milner, L’universel en eclats. Court traite
politique 3 [The Shattered Universal: Short Political Treatise 3] (Paris,
2014). Of special note is the brief discussion of Tacitus. Milner claims
that Tacitus inaugurates the tradition of viewing le nom juif as impeding
“l’operateur tout [the operator ‘all’]” (pp. 117--18). Milner suggests that
Tacitus bequeaths to the Greco-Roman world the following “axiomatic”
formulation: “Dans un espace discursive ou le tout est cense donner acce`s
au lieu des solutions vraies, le nom juif dit que non a toute solution [in a
discursive space where the ‘all’ is intended to provide for true solutions, the
Jewish name says no to all solutions]” (p. 118). See also Jean-Claude Milner,
L’arrogance du present: Regards sur une decennie: 1965-1975 [The Arrogance
of the Present: Looking Back on a Decade, 1965--1975] (Paris, 2009), where
Milner claims that “le nom juif” has replaced “le nom ouvrier” as the political
name par excellence.
16. Hannah Arendt, “Martin Heidegger at Eighty,” trans. Albert
Hofstadter, The New York Review of Books, October 21, 1971.
17. For recent biographies of Benny Levy, see: Gilles Hanus, Benny
Levy: L’eclat de la pensee [Benny Levy: The Flair of Thought] (Paris, 2013)
and Leo Levy, A la vie [To Life] (Paris, 2013).
18. Benny Levy, Le meurtre du pasteur: Critique de la vision politique du
monde [The Murder of the Pastor: Critique of the Political Vision of the
World] (Paris, 2002).
19. Ibid., p. 10.
20. Ibid., p. 13.
21. Ibid., p. 173.
22. Ibid., p. 174.
23. Ibid., p. 175.
24. For a discussion of Spinoza’s “critical hermeneutics” and the prob-
lems latent in his treatment of miracles, see Oded Schechter, “Spinoza’s
Miracles: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Critical Hermeneutics,” in Yearbook
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of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, edited by Bill Regiber (Berlin,
2018), pp. 89--108.
25. B. Levy, Le meurtre, pp. 220--25.
26. Ibid., p. 247.
27. Ibid., pp. 248--51. G. Hanus, Sans images, ch. 3, takes up Levy’s
interpretation of Spinoza’s equivocal account of Moses as prophetic
lawgiver.
28. In the TTP, Spinoza moves freely between talking of “the Hebrews”
and, less frequently, “the Jews.” Generally, he prefers to speak of “the
Hebrew x”: “the Hebrew nation,” “the Hebrew republic,” “the Hebrew
citizens,” and “the Hebrew history.” In other contexts, he also employs
other terms such as “the people of Israel” or “the Israelites.” It has been
suggested that, for Spinoza, “the Hebrews” are the people of the ancient
Hebrew State, whereas “the Jews” are the people of exile; however, I don’t
find him observing this distinction very rigorously. Following Milner, I will
retain the usage of “Jewish” or “the Jews” to mean all the above.
29. TTP, ch. iii, §§53--56 / G III 56--57.
30. This is what I understand to be established by TTP, ch. vii, §§76--82
and TTP, ch. xix, §§9--29. Spinoza there explains how it is that the Jewish
revealed religion acquired the force of law from the right of the Jewish
state, and how it is, more generally, that a religious command can bind a
people to act piously towards fellow countrymen. However, Spinoza is at
odds to explain how it is that the Jewish people could be so zealously
reverent towards the law, while nevertheless proving so rebellious at times.
Spinoza’s answer is that the lawgiver (Moses) did not foresee that the Tribe
of Levi, by monopolizing the power to administer sacred matters, would
eventually become like a “state within a state” and thus challenge the po-
litical authority. See TTP, ch. vii, §§93--111. Note lastly that for Spinoza,
Jewish history begins not with Abraham but with Moses and the flight from
Egypt, at which stage the Jewish people were as if in a “state of nature.” See
TTP, ch. xvii, §26 / G III 205, ll. 18--19.
31. The claim appears to prefigure secular Zionism: the Jewish state
will be established when the right this-worldly opportunity presents itself to
the Jews and not when a divine, extra-worldly being intervenes on behalf of
the Jews. Amos Funkenstein maintains that this does not however consti-
tute a Zionist doctrine, since for Spinoza, according to Funkenstein, noth-
ing the Jews themselves can do will accelerate this process. See Amos
Funkenstein, Maı¨monide:Nature, histoire et messianisme [Maimonides:
Nature, History, and Messianism], trans. Catherine Chalier (Paris, 1988),
pp. 111--14.
32. TTP, ch. iii, §54/G III 56, ll. 23--30.
33. This is the solution proposed by Lagree and Moreau. See Baruch
Spinoza, Œuvres comple`tes III: Le Traite Theologico-Politique [Complete Works
III: The Theologico-Political Treatise], edited by Fokke Akkermann,
Jacqueline Lagree, and Pierre-Franc¸ois Moreau (Paris, 1999), p. 721, n.
44. They suggest that Orobio de Castro (1617--87), a fellow Amsterdam
Jew born in Portugal, endorses Spinoza’s view that the assimilation was,
at first, generally successful and unaccompanied by persecution. But upon
Spinoza and Judaism 27
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
j/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/m
j/kjaa004/5831113 by guest on 06 M
ay 2020
closer inspection of his work De Veritate Religionis Christiniae Amica Collatio
cum Erudito Judaeo, published in Amsterdam in 1687, we see that de Castro
does not endorse Spinoza’s claim: rather, he notes that alongside the assim-
ilated “New Christians” there proliferated the “persecutors of Jews.” For
more about this, see J.-C. Milner, Le sage trompeur, appendix 4.
34. “I myself know, among others, a certain Judah, whom they call the
faithful who in the midst of the flames, when he was already believed to be
dead, began to sing the hymn which begins: ‘To Thee, Lord, I offer my
soul’. And in the middle of the song he breathed his last.” [Ep. 76 to Burgh
from Spinoza, end of 1675 to beginning of 1676]. On the Spinoza--Burgh
correspondence and Spinoza’s critique of Roman Catholicism, see Edwin
Curley, “Spinoza’s exchange with Albert Burgh,” in Spinoza’s Theological-
Political Treatise: A Critical Guide, edited by Yitzhak Y. Melamed and
Michael Rosenthal (Cambridge, UK, 2010), pp. 11--28. In his work on the
history of “crypto-Judaism” in Spain, Henry Mechoulan suggests that
Spinoza is, in fact, deliberately misleading his reader when he claims to
“know” Judah the Faithful. See Henry Mechoulan, Les juifs du silence au
sie`cle d’or espagnol [Jews of Silence in the Spanish Golden Age] (Paris, 2003),
p. 117. But it is not clear whether Spinoza is implying in his letter that he
knew Judah the Faithful personally, or only knew of him by hearsay.
35. Also note the strange way Spinoza hints at the Portuguese
Inquisition in the extract above, as if under the cover of a euphemism.
Converted Portuguese Jews only “lived separately,” Spinoza writes.
Nothing is said of the massacres.
36. TTP, ch. iii, §16 / G III 47.
37. Spinoza repeats this claim in TTP, ch. xvii, §§93--94, while discus-
sing the alleged rebelliousness of the Hebrew nation: “Surely nature cre-
ates individuals, not nations, individuals who are distinguished into nations
only by differences of language, laws and accepted customs. Only the latter
two factors, laws and customs, can lead a nation to have its mentality, its
particular character, and its particular prejudices.”
38. It is not easy to see how this claim is consistent with the claim that,
“no one chooses any manner of living for himself, or does anything, except
by the special calling of God, who has chosen him before others for this
work, or for this manner of living” (TTP, ch. iii, §10). On this understand-
ing, Spinoza could allow for some “special calling” wherein, say, this par-
ticular nature is more sagacious, etc.
39. TTP, ch. iii, §15 / G III 47.
40. Several passages in Spinoza’s Political Treatise reinforce the view
that not all nations or “multitudes” are equally well-disposed to any form of
government whatsoever due to their respective histories and the way these
histories have flavored their political cultures. See TP, ch. vi, §26.
41. TTP, ch. iii, §15.
42. TTP, ch. ii, §46.
43. See TTP, chs. i--ii and xvii.
44. See TTP, ch. xvii, where Spinoza’s discussion of the “history of the
Hebrews” is particularly detailed. There, the focal point of Spinoza’s anal-
ysis of Jewish history is his assessment of the political crisis engendered by
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the Tribe of Levi’s monopolization of sacerdotal matters after Moses’
death. See also TTP, ch. xviii, where Spinoza elaborates on the “excellent
features” of “the form the Hebrew state” that are “perhaps worth imitating”
[TTP, ch. xviii, §1].
45. J.-C. Milner, Le sage trompeur, Introduction, pp. 9--10.
46. Leo Strauss “Persecution and the Art of Writing” [1941], in
Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago, 1952), p. 30.
47. TTP, ch. iii, §53 / G III 56, ll. 16--23
48. TTP, ch. xvii, §§80--81 / G III 215
49. J.-C. Milner, Le sage trompeur, ch. ii, §§3.1.3--4.
50. Broadly speaking, the TTP’s project consists in pointing out reli-
gious authorities who, having misunderstood the true nature of religion,
seek to destabilize political authorities, and thus encourage the fomenting
of hatred and discord among peoples. It is in this respect that the
“Pharisees” become unmistakably the target of Spinoza’s most virulent
criticisms in the TTP.
51. TTP, ch. iii, §54 / G III 56, ll. 22--34.
52. Some passages in Spinoza’s later Political Treatise strongly contra-
dict Milner on this point, viz., that it matters to Spinoza whether an impe-
rium’s leader is led by passions or reason. For example, TP, ch. i, §6. On the
other hand, TTP, ch. iii, §15 does support Miner’s reading.
53. See Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Quentin Skinner, 2nd
ed. (Cambridge, 2019), ch. xxi.
54. See TP, ch. vii, §30.
55. J.-C. Milner, Le sage trompeur, ch. iii, §4.
56. Ibid., ch. v, §5.2.
57. See Gershom Scholem, Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah, trans. R.
J. Zwi Werblowsky (Princeton, NJ, 1973), as well as S. Nadler, Spinoza: A
Life, pp. 249--54.
58. For example, TTP, ch. xviii / G III 227. Spinoza writes that, “the
form of each state must necessarily be retained” and “it cannot be changed
without a danger that the whole state will be ruined.” Presumably, for
Spinoza, a well-designed democracy, a “completely absolute state,” will
be as stable as the Ottoman Empire, though without the drawbacks. See
TP, ch. xi.
59. J.-C. Milner, Le sage trompeur, ch. vi, §4.1.
60. Ibid., ch. vii, §1.1 and §§2.1--2.
61. Ibid, Epilogue, pp. 102--08.
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